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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
R. MILTON YORGASON, 
Salt Lake County Assessor, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
vs. 
COUNTY ROARD OF EQUALIZATION 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, ex. rel., 
EPISCOPAL M.ANAGEMENT CORP., 
Case No. 18086 
Defendant, Respondant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
R. MILTON YORGASON 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Cons is tent with the duties of his emplo,'rnent, the 
plaintiff Salt Lake County Assessor, caused the real property 
and improvements located at 650 South 3rd East, Salt Lake City, 
County of Salt Lake to be assessed and duly taxed. Episcopal 
Manaoement Corporation, the owner of the propertv, sought review 
rf the to the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
rJaim1ng complete exemption taxation on the basis nf the 
''hrlrltable exemption found in Article 13, Section 2 of the Utah 
I ( • 1"l t i_ t j t_ ) 0 r. . The assessment having been vacated by the County 
HGnrd ,, : Equalization, the plaintiff Assessor, sought review 
',,r, : h•' Goard' s d0rision c,t the state administrative level 
before the State Tax Commission of UL1h, and later in the tax 
division of the Third District Court. The claimed exemption 
being upheld by the District Court, the plaintiff Assessor, row 
seeks the review by this Court of the lower Court's decision. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Tax Division of the Third Judicial District Court, 
the Honorable Judge Dean Conder presiding, dismissed the plain-
tiff's Writ of Review with prejudice, finding the property to be 
used exclusively for a charitable purpose and thereby exempt 
from taxation pursuant to Article XIII, Section two of the Utah 
Constitution and UCA Section 59-2-30, as amended 1953. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/appellant seeks review and reversal of the 
lower Court's Judgment and pravs that the case bP remanded back 
to the District Court, with direction that said Court make and 
enter its judgment and decree to state that the defendant's 
of the St. Marks Tower property is not exclusively for chari-
table purposes and that such propertv be placed upon the tax 
rolls of Salt Lake County, and that the same be dulv assessed 
and taxed for tax years 1980 and followinq. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, Episcopal Management, was organized as 
a nonprofit corporation in the State of Utah in April of 1978. 
IT.P. p34) The purpose of the Corporation is to aid the elderly 
and handicapped through the construction of housing for those 
people using all federal, state and private housing assistance 
which might be available. (T.R. p34) The Corporation was 
provided specific authority to do what was necessary in order to 
obtain federal monies under Section 202 of the National Housing 
Act of 1959. (T.R. p35) 
The Board of Directors is authorized to have from five 
to nine members with the Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Utah 
being an unremovable Board member. (Article Seventh of the 
Corporate Articles as attached to the transcript of the hearing 
before the Utah State Tax Commission, such transcript being 
ircluded in the trial record by stipulation of the parties, at 
T.R. p38) 
The Corporate Articles cannot be amended without the 
consent of the Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese. (Article Thir-
'_or·nth, Ibid) L1pon dissolution of the Corporation, the net 
proceeds may be given to any organization operAted for charit-
• h l t', edccat1onal, relio1ous or scientific purposes. (Article 
:'th, rbin). After incorporation, the Management Corporation 
applied and received a loan of from the SPr:cPtar: 
of Housing and Urban Development 1111'1') serured by a fort]' yecar 
mortgage. (T.R. p37) With these funrls in hand, thf' crrporation 
acquired the subject land and built the housing pro1ect known ac 
the St. Marks Tower consisting of 98 rental units, common areas 
and administrative office. (T.R. p36) 
A Stipulation of Facts was entered by the parties. 
(T.R. p33-39) Among the uncontested facts were the following: 
a) Both the mortgage and operating expenses of the Tower are 
sustained solely by rent-. al revenue. (T. R. p3 8) 
b) The rental amount is established on the basis of fair 
market value for equivalent facilities in the communitv as 
required by HUD regulations. (T.R. p37) 
c) Of the current rental amount of $433.00 per month per unit, 
the tenant pays only one quarter of his or her gross 
earnings towards such housing and the federal government 
pays the balance. (T. R. p3 I) 
d) To be eligible for these accommodations, the tenant cannot 
have annual earnings of more than $12,000.0n, or 
for a couple. (T. R. p37) 
e) The tenant must be at least vears nf agP or handicapperl, 
however no more than of the tenants fall 
handicapped classificatinn. (T.R. p'li) 
Certain additional facts were learned at the adminis-
trative hearing before the Utah State Tax Commission. The Tower 
is only bound bv law to provide a decent, safe and sanitary 
housing facility (testimony of Operations Director for the 
Tower, P 10, L 22-25, State Tax Commission transcript) Its 
management attempts through coordination of outside services to 
keep the tenant independent and away from the nursing home 
setting. It is not, however, a substitute for nursing home care 
(page 8-13, 53-54, State Tax Commission transcript). 
There are no tenants living in the facility without 
charge. 
The plaintiff/appellant levied the required property 
tax assessment on the Tower property believing the property's 
use not to be a truly charitable one as defined by Utah Consti-
tution and Statute. (T.R. p47) The lower Court held against the 
salt Lake County Assessor thereby concluding that the property 
is used exclusively for charitable purposes and therefore exempt 
from taxation. From this ruling, plaintiff appealed. 
POINT I 
SERVING A SOCIAL NEED BY PROVIDING LOW-INCOME 
HOUSING IS APART FROM AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A 
CHARITABLE PURPOSE AS DEFINED BY UTAH LAW. 
The defendant/respond0rct h0s foc:"usec! on national 
studies in an attempt to show Salt J0ke County has a need for 
low-income housing. Fowever, even assuming this County has a 
deficiency in low-cost housing for its elderly, an exclusive 
charitable use is not simply a finding that a social need is 
being served. 
In Beerman Foundation Inc., v Board of Tax Appeals 87 
N.E. 2d 474, 475 (Ohio 194Cl), a nonprofit foundation constructecl 
apartments for occupancoy by war veterans who had impaired 
earning power. The monthly rental was $35.00, however, the fair 
value of comparable units was $75.00. The Court found this 
amounted to a rent subsidy. The Court quoted the Appeals Board 
as saying: 
.. None are housed free of cost. If applicant's 
space were not available these eight tenants 
would presumably have to find less Clesirable 
quarters within their means. Is applicant's 
philanthropy in foregoing a profit the 
criterion? .. 
The Court later answers this question by stating: 
The use of the property in the instant case is 
primarily for furnishing low rent housing and not 
exclusively for charitahle purposes. 
The resulting tax exemption in finding ar exclusivclv 
charitable purpose is the re2son for differentiatino social 
frcm a charitable purpose. Onl} bv a taxpayer takirq upon 1ts 
shoulders what the taxing entit·• rrc>sently carries or is ,,),-
b 
ligated to assume, will the taxpayer be allowed to escape its 
share of taxes. 
In United Presbyterian Association v Board of County 
Commissioners 448 P. 2d 967, 975 (Colorado 1975), the Court dealt 
with the exemption status of a senior citizen's home. Finding 
aaainst the charitable exemption the Court said, 
The Justification for charitable tax exemption, 
especially insofar as the rights of the body 
politic are involved, is that if the charitable 
work were not being done by a private party, it 
would have to be undertaken at public expense. 
***** 
.. The furnishing of homes to older adults is not 
in itself a charitable purpose. 
Here the defendant provides no real services which the 
County would otherwise have to provide. No justification 
therefore exists for granting the exemption. 
The defendant has emphasized that it obtained the 
needed funding for the Tower from federal HUD monies and that 
the National Housing Act, which authorizes such funds, clearly 
s0ts forth the need for low-income housing. Yet the federal 
;tatutory provisiors do not hinge any funding on the property 
being tax exempt from local taxation. Again, the social need 
·11.d '.he tax exemption are based on different criteria. See 12 
11,S.C.A. SPction 1701 et SPQ. 
In Paraclete Mar(H of Kansas Cit\' v StatP 'T'ax rommio:-
sion 447 S.W.2d 311, 312-315 (M1sc,ouri 19r;q) the plaintiff USPd 
the same federal funding as defendant in the present case. As 
in the instant case, the rents were geared to pay the mort-
gage and ongoing expenses. Unlike the Tower, which gets what 
the market will allow,the rent was found to be $25.00-$30.00 
less than comparable units in the community. A2- though the 
tenants were charged equally for the same kind of unit, many 
received other welfare or, as in the present case, supplements 
from the federal government. The Court ruled against the 
charitable exemption finding: 
... that it was thus intended to be completely 
self-supporting and self-liquidating without any 
intention that gifts or charity were to be in-
volved; [and] that it is thus actually competitive 
with landlords offering other residential property 
for rent on which taxes must be paid, ... 
The Paraclete Manor Court, the United Presbvterian 
Association case, and the earlier noted Beerman opinion all keep 
in tact those reasons for allowing a tax exemption. That beir.q 
the act of giving which results in a displacement of government 
services and subsequent savings of public monies. The defendant 
here qives no gifts as part of its dav-to-day operations 
takes over no current County services. No reason therefore 
exists under existiny t0sts for charitable tcix PXPmptinns tn 
grant the property said PY.emption. 
The defendant persuaded the lower Court that but for 
its housing facility, some of its tenants might be found in Utah 
nursing homes with Medicaid incurring the bill. (T.R. p60) Even 
if this were found to be more than mere speculation, it would 
not be pertinent in that Salt Lake County as an entity does not 
Medicaid. This Court has required the above mentioned quid 
pro quo relationship to exist in Salt Lake Lodge No. 85, 
B.P.O.E. v Groesbeck 40 Utah 1, 120P 192, 194 (1911). The 
present facts are void of any services being supplied by the 
defendant for which the plaintiff County would otherwise be 
obligated to pay. Since this case deals only with County 
property taxation, no exemption based on charity can be 
maintained because of the lack of displacement of local 
government responsibilities. 
The plaintiff is not attempting to demean the useful 
service the defendant is supplying. As brought out in the 
h0aring at the State Tax Commission, the defendant is making the 
lives of its tenants much more pleasant. However, the facts 
supportinq a finding of charity do not exist in this case. 
POINT II 
TPF ACT OF MAKING A GIFT IS ESSENTIAL TO AN 
EXCLUSIVELY CBAFITABLE PURPOSE AND DEFENDANT DOES 
NOT C'C'·NTRIRfTTE ANYTHING TO ITS TENANTS. 
Clearly, a findino 0f char l t;' includes a f11cdJ ng of 
giving. In Salt Lake Countv v Tax Commission et al., P)d 
641, 643 (Utah 1979), the Court wrote, 
Charity is the contribution or dedicatio11 of 
something of value to the poor or at least to the 
common good ... By exempting property used for 
charitable purposes, the constitutional conven-
tion sought to encourage individual or group 
sacrifice for the welfare of the community. An 
essential element of charity is giving. (emphasis 
added) 
In the present facts, thP defendant borrowed federal 
funds to build the Tower. The mortgage and day-to-day expenses 
are paid either bv the tenant or the same federal funds as used 
to build the project. The Tower is managed by a private corpo-
ration which has the right to make a profit and claims no 
exemption. The would-be taxpaver as owner of the facility has 
contributed nothing of relative significance in alleviating the 
needs of our elderly, yet now claims a tax exemption on the 
basis of its charity. 
The lower Court was convinced by the defendant that 
the source of the charitable gift is irrelevant. Thus by the 
federal government providing rent subsidies to keep the building 
running, the of the property w0s somehow masked with the 
charitable intent. It seems cr,vi 0us t,h2t before a la11downer 
deserves exemption status due to charity, the landowner must 
be the source of the gift and the propertv be used 
sively for the charitable purpose. 
10 
The element of personal sacrifice has long been a 
standing requirement to a finding of charity. In Friendsview 
Manor v State Tax Commission 420 P.2d 77, 80-81 (Oregon 1966), 
the Court had a similar set of facts before it. A retirement 
home was claiming exemption from real property taxation as a 
charitable institution. The property did not receive federal 
funds, but required a substantial founder's fee, monthly rental 
and received voluntary community gift support. The Court found 
the petitioner in a few instances did pay all or part of the 
founder's fee and monthly charges for persons unable to pay. 
The petitioner alleged that its charitable purpose is evidenced 
in its care of the elderly whether rich or poor. The Court held 
against the exemption. It found it essential that the property 
be donated by others and not purchased by the users of the 
property before a charitable exemption would be granted. 
Quoting an earlier case, the Court wrote, 
that in order for the activities of a 
taxpayer to entitle him to exemption as "social 
welfare" work they must be calculated to benefit 
some other group than the one which supplies the 
money and directs its disposition ... [I]n the 
benefaction some mode of altruism must clearly 
shine forth. (emphasis added) 
The present facts hold not the tenant paving the large 
rr·en t age of nePded :-en ta 1, but the federal government. 
1sticiill:' +-he taxpauers of th1s N<Jticr 2re t:he ones supply-
'nn the needPd support. Public funds have nevPr been considered 
11 
a charitable gift. The defe,.,rlant, <''l•' 1<ould be oblicrcit0rl tn 
pe1y the property tax, has gi'ien nntl11nq. 
It should be remembered that the Cruntv as an irdeper-
dent taxing unit with its independent budqet responsibilitiec ic 
the one which will lose the tax revenue otherwise generated by 
defendant and others engaged in similar tasks. The taxpayers of 
this Nation are the only group having given anything in this 
case, and they have done so void of any altruistic intent. The 
defendant being exempt from federal income taxation is the onlv 
entity which has contributed nothing, but seeks an exemption 
based on its benevolence. This Court, along with other .state 
courts, looks to the defendant taxpayer's charitable intent, the 
use of the property and the displacement of government 
services. This defendant has made no significant gift of itsel'. 
and assumes no County government responsibilities. The pcoper+y 
is not used exclusively for charitable purposes. 
The lower Court's ruling that the source of the 
necessary funding was irrelevant in determinina the exclusi•·p 
charitable character of the would-be taxpayer, is contrary to 
the mandate of this Court 3ncJ others which recuire a chari talJlP 
or benevolent intent be &ound to exist in the and, a• 
exclusively charitable use •>t the prnocrt\. 
Douglas v OFA Senior Citizen's Inc., 1 1 1 NW d 7 l 9 , 
(Nebraska 1961), the Nebraska Court was fciced w1 th s1rni 1,ir 
o.s this Court is presently. The building was used for low-
income rental to the elderly on a nonprofit basis. Social 
programs were provided and the rental was based upon costs of 
upkeep and amortization of the mortgage. The residents were 
accepted without determining whether they could pay the rental 
or not and many were subsidized by receiving work and assistance 
in order that they could meet the rent. The tenants were 
required to pay the rental amount although inability to pay did 
not result in eviction. The rental, however, was never abated 
and outside sources were sought to pay the owed amounts. No 
specific rights were granted the tenants to remain in the 
facility without payment of the rental from some source. Again 
the exemption was The Court said, 
In this it is not difficult to perceive that the 
operations of the defendant included worthy 
charitable aspects but it may not well be said 
that this ownership and use was exclusively 
charitable ... 
The elements the Nebraska Court found to be control-
'ing are clearly present here. The defendant bases its rental 
''r the costs of maintaining the building and amortizing the 
mortgage. The tenants have no express rights which would 
1 •0vent their eviction if the monthly rental could not be paid. 
1• they were unable to pav their share of the rent, they could 
nrt rr'sicle at the faciUty. The Court specifically 
1 3 
finds that rental payments by thirct parti0s is not suffirient tn 
grant the landowner taxpayer charitaule status. The promotion 
the charitable intent being a significant element in the 0xemp-
tion status. 
The defendant is improving the living conditions of 
some of the area elderly and plaintiff would not belittle that 
effort. But as shown above, the defendant as a taxpaying entity 
does not fulfill the elements of an exclusively charitable 
institution and the taxpayers of Salt Lake County should not 
shoulder the defendant's property tax responsibilit"'· 
POINT rr:r 
THE PAPENT ENTITY OF THE DEFENDANT MAY WELL 
BENEFIT BY THE TOWER PROPERTY AND SUCH BENEFIT 
PF.EVENTS AN EXEMPTION BASED ON AN EXCLUSIVE 
CHARITABLE PURPOSE. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, the Bishop of the 
Episcopal Diocese of Utah is a permanent member of the defen-
dant's Board of Directors. The l>.rticles cannot be amencted 
without his vote being amongst the majority. (Article Seven and 
Thirteen of the defendant's of Incorporation) Upon 
dissolution of the Corporatinn, the net proceec's ma'/ go to an·· 
religious or charitable institution which ob••iously inrludes th• 
Episcopal Church. (Article Twelve, Ibict) 
14 
Effectivelv, the Episcopal Church has built a 98 unit 
residential complex at no cost to itself. The complex is run at 
no cost to it and if it is later sold, the entire sales price 
will be a nontaxable gain. The Diocese has aided the area aged 
and can make a fantastic sum of money at the same time. 
Plaintiff does not attempt to place this possibility in an 
unfavorable light. However, the possibility of the benefit 
enuring to the Episcopal Church is real. Both social and 
religious needs can be benefitted. However, this outlook does 
prevent a tax exemption on the b2sis of an exclusive charitable 
purpose. 
In Parker et al v Quinn 23 Utah 332, 64 P. 961, 962 
fUtah 1901), the plaintiff as trustee held legal title to 
property for the benefit of the Fifteenth Ward Relief Society. 
The taxable property was a two-story building, the upper level 
used by the Relief Society for its exclusive charitable and 
work. The lower level was rented out and the proceeds 
contributed toward the furtherance of the charitable work. This 
Court found that property held by the Society as a source of 
income was not used for an exclusively charitable purpose, even 
though the income was put toward the charitable function. 
The same result occurred in the Idaho case of Malad 
Ward of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v 
Stat<-' Tax Commissi0n 269 P.2d 1077, 1079 (1954). There, the 
ls 
land of the plaintiff was usc,c1 to raise' hlhc>at which was ulti-
mately used in the Church's 1:•rnCJrcim. The Court held nc' 
charitable exemption existed under the farts. It sajd, 
Conceding the claimant to be organized as a 
charitable institution or society, it is not 
entitled to exemption from taxation on property 
which it owns and from which it derives a reve-
nue, even if the funds or produce so derived are 
devoted exclusivelv to charitable purposes. 
The defendant in the present case has yet to contri-
bute the gain from the Tower to its parent Diocese. However, 
the established doctrine of strict construction has always 
pertained to tax exemptions. As the Parker Court stated, in 
cases on this subject, all doubts must be resolved aaainst 
exemption. Therefore, the very real possibility of the Diocese 
retaining the large gain created by the Tower project, 
eliminates the Tower from obtaining exemption status based on an 
exclusive charitable purpose. 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT Hi'\.S PREVIOUSLY HELD THAT HOUSING 
FACILITIES SUCH AS DEFENDANT'S DO NOT CONSTITUTE 
A USE FOR AN EXCLUSIVELY CHARITABLE PURPOSE. 
The defendants ir the lower Court attempted to 
entiate itself from the Friendship Manor property. The elcme'lts 
; 6 
f"his Court focused on in Friendship Manor Corporation v Tax 
Commission /6 Ut2h 2d 227, 487 P.2d 1272, 1275-1280 (1971), in 
dPnying the tax PXemption are equally present in this case. 
The Friendship Manor opinion dealt with a nonprofit 
organization comprised of five religious denominations which had 
financed a high-rise residential complex through federal funds. 
The building was especially designed for elderly persons and 
social programs were amply provided. The tenants had to be able 
to physically take care of themselves and the management re-
quired the tenants pay for what thPy received. The rental for 
the units was set so that the rental alone would pay for all 
upkeep and provide for retirement of the mortgage period. The 
plaintiff taxpayer argued that it should be found tax exempt due 
to its nonprofit status, its stated purpose, its charitable 
status under federal tax law, the specially designed building 
?nd the social programs that it provided. 
In the reportPd opinion, this Court examined several 
State Court casPs on the topic. Quoting the New Mexico 
Court it said, 
It is clear that rents are fixed at an amount 
riPcessary to pay the interPst, amortize the 
principal, ard pay all expenses of maintaining 
the propPrty. By what theory this should not 
include taxes on the same basis as other compar-
able properties is not clear to us... It was 
intended to be self-supporting, without any 
thought that gifts or charity be involved. 
Mountainview Homes, Inc., v State Tax Commission 
427 P.2d 13 (1967) 
1 7 
The present facts fall well wit-hin the quidPl_ines 
expressed by the Utah and New Mexjco Courts. The Tower charqes 
rent comparative to similar units in the area. The rental is 
gauged so to pay all costs of maintenance and mortgage combined. 
Although the federal government pays for a large portion of the 
rental, the owner of the facility is giving nothing. It is not 
assuming a burden of government. The government is discharging 
the burden. None of the funds used to run the facility are 
donated by anyone holding an altruistic intent. 
In holding against the exemption, the Friendship Manor 
Court focused on the fact that the rental for Friendship Manor 
units was not based on need, but what was required to retire the 
principle, together with upkeep expenses. Here, the rental is 
calculated on the same basis as Friendship Manor. The tenants 
portion of the rent is based on their gross earnings. The 
rental actually due is in no way a reflection of the tenants 
ability to pay. Further, the rental portion not paid by the 
tenant is not paid by the defendant or any third party wishing 
to make a charitable gift. The facts determined in the earlier 
case are equally determinative here. 
In the recent past, this Court has decided a rumber Jf 
Fraternal Lodge cases where the issue was whether the property 
was used exclusively for charitable purpose. See Benevolent and 
Protective Order of Elks v Tax Commission 536 P.2d 1214 (Utah 
18 
1975) and Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v County Board of 
Equalization of Salt Lake County 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982). 
These cases have dealt not with the charitable function of the 
individual organization, but with the exclusiveness of the 
charitable work provided by each entity upon the property for 
which the exemption was claimed. 
The present facts deal not with whether the defendant 
functions solely as a charitable organization, but whether its 
only function fits within the very narrow confines of the 
charitable definition. 
very significant one. 
This difference in issue is a thin, but 
The Tower's activities do not include 
both charitable and nonchari table purposes. Its financial 
organization and payment policy either pushes the Tower property 
into the tax exemption or prevents its property from being found 
charitable. 
The Utah case most factually similar to the present is 
obviously the Friendship Manor opinion. That case also began 
the marked swing toward the more stringent view of tax exemp-
tions visible in this Court's latest opinions. No longer is the 
individual responsibility of local taxation shifted onto the 
shoulders of others based on labels resembling a charitable use, 
yPt lacking the essential intent and elements of such charity. 
Too needed local government proqrams currently go unfunded 
to grant local tax exemptions to those who do not hold the 
l lJ 
benevolent self-giving intent so much a part of the term char-
ity. The burden upon the over-burdened taxpayer is constantly 
increasing. 
The Tower simply does not furnish those services 
currently financed by Salt Lake County and clearly lacks the 
fact and the intent of giving, all of which are needed before a 
charitable purpose is established. 
POINT V 
THE PROVISION OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZED LOW INCOME 
HOUSING IS NOT A FUNCTION FOR WHICH CHARITABLE 
EXEMPTIONS ARE GIVEN. 
Low income housing whereby the tenants receive a 
higher living standard for the rent they pay with public funds 
paying the remaining rental amounts, is not an exclusively 
charitable function. 
In Hilltop Villaqe Inc. v Kerrville Independent School 
District 487 S.W.2d 167, 168-169 (Tf'xas 197'.'), the nonprofit 
corporation had earlier lost a legal battle on the issue of the 
charitable tax exemption, amended its Articles so to fit within 
the initial Court opinion and fought the same issue in a later 
tax year. The Amended Articles specific2lly gave the tPnants 
the right to remain in the facility even though they could not 
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pay th0 costs of thPir care. The Facility included a nursing 
home and the facts indicated that tenants were at least charged 
or. the basis of their government assistance. Where the rental 
payments were insufficient to pay for upkeep and retirement of 
the mortgage, bona fide gifts and voluntary contributions were 
sought. The Court again held against the tax exemption because 
the tenants were accepted on the basis of their fina.ncial 
circumstances which was the government assistance payment. 
The Tower's Articles of Incorporation are void of 
language stating the tenant's right to remain in the facility 
without the government payments along with the payment of one 
fourth of the tenant's gross earnings. Unlike Hilltop, the 
Tower receives no revenue from gifts or voluntary contributions. 
The Tower is not licensed to perform the activities of a nursing 
home, as Hilltop was, and the Tower can not rPplioice those 
services a nursing home provides as Hilltop did. 
The Tower's sole purpose, that of accepting government 
payments to pay the required rPntal which is set at a fair 
value, does not approach the charity even provided by 
flilltcp and should not be accorded a charitable exemption. 
In Lutheran Home, Inc. v Board of County Commissioners 
ot Dickinson Countv 505 P.2d 1118, 1124-1125 (Kansas 1973) a 
nursino home-residential fucility appealed the County's rejec-
•1cr. cf their exemption upplication. The F2cility chLlrged fair 
market value for its premises with 01w-hi'llf 0f thP tenants 
making the rental by use of their Wcoltare assistance. The 
rental income was sufficient to maintain the building and pay 
off the mortgage. In discussing the applicablP law, the Court 
cited those cases listed by the defendant, Episcopal Management, 
ruling for exemption under apparently similar facts. The Court 
rejected those holdings outright, instead quoting with favor 
from Mason v Zimmerman 106 p 1005, 1008 (Kansas 1910) it said 
•.. "charity" is a gift to promote the welfare of 
others in need, and "charitable" as used in the 
constitutional and statutory provisions means 
intended for charity. In this sense charity 
involves the doing of something generous for 
other human beings who are unable to provide for 
themselves .. Unless there is a gift, there can 
be no charity. 
The Court specifically equated the use of public funds 
to pay the required rental with that of family funds and refused 
to find such monies to be in any way charitable. Re:iecting the 
charitable exemption, the Court based its decision 0n the lack 
of any gift from the plaintiff corporation to the residents of 
the home or to any one else. 
The only difference betwPen the Tower and Luthcri'ln 
Home Inc. opinion, is that public funds are a laraer part of thP 
Tower's revenue. No gifts or contributions exist in eitlwr 
case. As noted by the Kansas Court, the promotion cf 
gifts being the purpose beh"nd the exemption, no such c,xernpt inr 
) ) 
can be granted without the gifts existence. As the Court 
public funds are not gifts. 
Another case factually similar to the present is Dow 
City Senior Citizen's Housing, Inc., v Board of Review of 
Crawford County 230 N.W.2d 497, 498-499 (Iowa 1975). There some 
business men organized the plaintiff corporation without compen-
sation. The land was cleared by volunteer labor. Cash dona-
tions were recf'ived in the form of outright gifts and "member-
ships" selling for $25.00 each which gave the holder voting 
rights only. The FHA loan used by the corporation required the 
tenants to earn no more than $9,000.00 annually. Although the 
rental was not adjusted on need, the Court specifically found no 
one had ever been rejected for inability to pay the rent. The 
facility was self-supporting and the units rental was markedly 
low for their quality. The Iowa Court held against the tax 
Pxemption basing its finding on the use of government loan 
monPy. It said, 
..the government, through the FHA loan program, 
has already assumed a large share of the burden 
of meeting the need for low-rent housing for 
elderly persons. Plaintiff has not shown that 
the exemption statute should be applied in its 
favor to create an additional burden on other 
propert:,• taxpayers in the community. (emphasis 
added) 
The Iowa Court pointed out that the plaintiff was 
meeting a real need tor the elderly persons in the area, but 
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meeting a social need was separate and 0part from a charitable 
use. 
The Tower not only relies on public funding for its 
mortgage, but is dependent on the same public funding to pay 
back the government mortgage. Like Dow City, the Tower now 
wishes the local taxpayers to take on the additional burden of 
paying its property tax responsibility. 
The cases discussed above indicate that low income 
housing rarely fits within the narrow construction of the 
charitable exemption. Case law shows that such housing is never 
given a charitable exemption when public funds are used to pay 
the needed rental. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant has organized a corporation to provide 
the elderly a nicer environment in which to live out their 
lives. The Tower receives no gifts or contributions and in fact 
is entirely self-supporting by use of public funcs and tenant 
rent. Its goals are laudable, but its methods fall far the 
strict construction this Court has requirPd of charitable 
exemption cases. The Tower's property is not us Po for an 
exclusive charitable purpose as the Utah Constitution intPnded 
24 
the term to be defined and as case law has interpreted it. The 
defendant must be required to pay its share of the local tax 
obligation. 
The decision of the Trial Court should be reversed and 
the subject property should be placed upon the tax rolls of Salt 
Lake County for the year 1980 and all subsequent years. 
Attorney 
Respectfully submitted this 
29th day of April, 1983, 
THEODORE CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Special Deputy County 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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two true and correct copies of the aforegoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
to Albert J. Colton, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, postage 
prepaid, at 800 Continental Bank Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101, Chi> 29Ch day of April, 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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MICHELE MITCHELL 
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DOUGLAS B CANNON 
Re: R. Milton Yorgason v. County Board of Equalization 
of Salt Lake County, ex. rel., Episcopal Management 
Corp., Case No. 18986 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the Episcopal Management Corp., defendant-respond-
ent, submits supplemental authority in the above-referenced 
appeal. This matter was argued before the Court on October 
16, 1984. The Episcopal Management Corp. wishes to bring to 
the Court's attention, the case of Rio Vista Non-Profit 
Housing Corp. v. County of Ramsey, 277 N.W. 2d 187 (Minn. 
1979), a copy of which is attached hereto. 
In Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., No. 
17699 (filed June 26, 1985), the Utah Supreme Court enumer-
ated six factors "which must be weighed in determining whether 
a particular institution is, in fact, using its property 
'exclusively for . . charitable purposes.'" Id. slip op. at 
6. The six factors enumerated were adapted from the six-part 
test set forth by the Minnesota Supreme Court in North Star 
Research Institute v. County of Hennepin, 306 Minn. 1,6, 236 
N.\'I. 2d 754, 757 (1975). Id. slip op. at 6 n. 6. 
In a subsequent case, the Minnesota Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether "a non-profit corporation which provides 
housing under a .. federally subsidized program to families 
of modest incomes [is] an_ institution of 
Rio Vista Non-Profit Housing Corp. v. GP t or 
!.77 N.W. 2d 187, 189 (Minn. 1979). In that ca: e, t e. 
M1 nnesota Supreme Court applied its six-factor 
-
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Geoffrey Butler, Esq., Clerk 
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mining that such a non-profit corporation was an institution 
of purely public charity. Id. at 190-92. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court addressed the-Very issues which are before this 
Court in the instant appeal. In particular, the Rio Vista 
court held that federal government support of a non-profit 
corporation satisfies the requirement that a charitable 
institution be supported by donations and gifts. Id. at 
190-91. In fact, the Rio Vista court concluded that the 
non-profit housing corporation in that case met each of the 
six factors of Minnesota Law. Because the six factors 
enumerated by the Utah Supreme Court are almost identical to 
those enumerated by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court's decision in Rio Vista is of particular import 
to the instant appeal. 
JESR/AJC/lah 
Enclosure 
Sincerely, 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A Professional Corporation 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing 
letter to be mailed, postage fully prepaid, to: Bill Thomas 
Peters, No. 10 Exchange Place, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, 
OCeh 84lll chi> f"" dey of 
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RIO VISTA NO!'l-PROFIT HOUS. CORP. v. RAMSEY CTY. Minn. 187 
. .2dl87 
In th• Matter of th• P•tition of RIO VIS-
TA SOS-PROFIT HOL:SISG CORPO-
RA TJOS for Rni•w of Objections to 
Real Property Taxes Payable in 1976, 
App•llant, 
v. 
COUNTY OF RAMSEY, Respondent. 
SUit• of Minn•sota, R•spondent. 
No. 48302. 
Supreme Court of Minnesota. 
Feb. 23, 1979 
Nonprofit corporation, which provided 
housing under a federally subS1dized pro-
gram to families of modest income, appeal-
ed from ruling of District Court, Ramsey 
County, Stephen L. Maxwell, J., which held 
that it was not an institution of purely 
public charity and therefore not exempt 
from taxation. The Supreme Court, Todd, 
J., held that: (!) nonprofit corporation 
qualified as institution of purely public 
charity, and (2) statute providing for assess-
ments based on 20% market value on cer· 
lain low-rent housing did not apply to non-
profit corporation. 
Reversed. 
I. Taxation <:=241.1(1) 
to be considered in determining 
whether an entity comes within definition 
of a "charit) ··for taxation purposes are. (!) 
stal<'d purpose of undertaking, (2) Y•hether 
entity involved is supported by donations, 
131 w hcthcr recipients of the "charity" are 
required to pay for assistance received, (4) 
whethf•r income received produces a profit, 
1\1 beneficiaries of the "charity" and (6) 
whether dividends, or assets upon dissolu-
tion are available to pnvate interests. 
Se-e publication Vv'ords and Phrases 
for other 1ud1c1al constructions and 
definitions 
2.. Taxation <1=241.1(2) 
For purposes of determining whether 
nonprofit corporation providing federally 
subsidized housing was a "charity" so a.s to 
be exempt from real estate l<lxation, fact 
that federal government, and not a private 
institution was donor did not preclude de-
termination that nonprofit corporation was 
supported in part by donations. M.S.A. 
Const art. 10, § 1; M.S.A. § 272.02. 
3. Charities <1= l 
Nonprofit corporation's providing of 
housing for low and moderate income fami-
lies furthered a charitable objective and 
lessened burdens of government so a.s to 
satisfy one of six factors employed in deter-
mining whether an institution could proper-
ly be defined as a "charity." 
4. Taxation <1=241.1(5) 
Fact that portion of rents received by 
nonprofit corporation, which provided hous-
ing for families of modest income, was from 
tenants did not preclude finding that non-
profit corporation qualified as an institution 
of purely public charity so as to be entitled 
to l<lx exemption where federal govern-
ment subsidized tenant's payments to such 
an extent that tenants did not provide a 
major source of project's revenue. 
5. Taxation <1=241.1(2) 
Nonprofit corporation, which provided 
housing under a federally subsidized pro-
gram to families of modest income, quali-
fied as a ux-exempt institution of purely 
public charity. M.S.A.Const. art. 10, § I; 
M.S.A. § 272.02. 
6. Taxation <1=241.1(2) 
Statute providing for assessments 
based on 20% of market value on certain 
low-rent housing did not apply to nonprofit 
corporation, which provided housing under 
a federally subsidized program to families 
of modest income so as to qualify a.s a 
Uix-€xempt institution of purely public 
charity M.SA §§ 272.02, 273.13, subd. 17; 
M.S A.Const. art. 10, § I. 
Syllabus by the Court 
l. Appellant nonprofit corporation, 
which provides housing under a Federally 
subsidized program to families of modest 
income, qualifies as a tax-exempt institu-
tion of purely public charity. 
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2 Minn St 273 13, subd 17, which im-
poses a 20-pereent tax on certain low-rent 
housing, does not apply w tax..,xempt insti-
tutions of purely public charity. 
Doherty, Rumble & Butler and Timothy 
Halloran, St Paul, for appellant. 
William Randall, County Atty., St.even 
DeCoster and Thomas Poch, Asst County 
Attys., St Paul, Warren Spannaus, Atty. 
Gen, James W. Neher, Special Asst. Atty. 
Gen, Dept of Revenue, St Paul, for re-
spondents 
Heard before PETERSON, TODD, and 
SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by 
the court en bane 
TODD, Justice. 
Rio Visu Non-Profit Housing Corpora-
tion (Rio Visl<l) was organized for the pur-
pose of providing low-rent housing to fami-
lies of modest income. The construction 
costs and part of the renl<ll income are 
from Federally subsidized programs. Rio 
Visl<l challenged the assessment of real es-
Ll!t.e Ll!xes against its property. The trial 
court allowed the Ll!xes, asserting that Rio 
Visl<l was not an institution of purely public 
charity and therefore not exempt from Ll!x-
at1on \\'e reverse 
The matt.er was submitted to the trial 
court on stipulated facts, together with 
brief and oral testimony on behalf of Ram-
sey County The transcript of the oral tes-
timony was not furnished on appeal. Es-
sentiaily, the stipulated facts disclose that 
I. In 1972. the basic rents were $109 for a 1-
bedroom unit and S 154 for a 2-bedroom unit. 
and the market rents were $169 and $239, re-
Jn 1975, the basic rent of the I-bed-
room unit was raised to S 125, and the 2-bed-
room urut was raised to $165 The market rent 
increased to S 186 and $246. respe-cuvely In 
J 976, the basic rent increased charging the 
tenants for electnc1ty 
2. To be eligible for payment of a monthly rent 
Jess than the fair market value rent estabilshed 
for the unit, a tenanl must not have income m 
excess of the following amounts 
Rio Visl<l was incorporated in 1971 as a 
nonprofit corporation under Minn.St. c. 317. 
The purpose of the corporation was to pr<>-
vide low-rent housing to families of low and 
moderate incomes. A 48-unit complex was 
completed in 1972. The entire cost of con· 
struction was financed by a bank under the 
Federal Housing Program known as "sec-
tion 236... Under this program, the Federal 
Government guarantees the loan and pays 
directly to the bank the differenC€ between 
the 7 -percent interest charged by the bank 
on the loan and the I-percent interest on 
the loan charged to and paid by Rio Vista. 
Payments on the principal are also paid by 
Rio Visu. 
The loan is repaid mainly through rents 
charged to the tenants. Under the section 
236 program, Rio Vista must establish two 
standards of rent-{!) basic rent deter-
mined according to payments of principal 
on the loan and the I-percent interest, and 
(2) a fair market rent determined according 
to the payments of principal, interest, and 
mortgage insurance.1 The fair market rent 
is calculated according to amounts needed 
to repay the loan. However, tenants who 
satisfy the eligibility requirements of the 
section 236 program 2 pay an amount of 
rent equal to 25 percent of their income or 
the basic rent, whichever is great.er. In no 
event, however, is the tenant charged more 
than the fair market rent. Almost all ten-
ants at Rio Vista pay the basic rent and 
none are wealthy enough to pay the fair 
market rent. 
Under a different Federal program-the 
Rent Supplement Program-the Federal 
Number of Persons 
rn Household 
l person 
2 persons 
3 persons 
4 persons 
5 persons 
6 persons 
Maximum Annual 
Income 
s 9,600 
ll,000 
12,400 
13,800 
H.7oo 
15.500 
A tenant must also qualify as one of the 
following (I) Be a member of a family of two 
or more persons related by blood, marriage, or 
operation of Jaw, who occupy the same unit, 
(2) a single person, 62 years of age or older; (3) 
physically handicapped. (4) a single person un· 
der 62 years of age, provided that no more than 
RIO VISTA NON-PROFIT HOUS. CORP. v. RAMSEY CTY. Minn. 189 
Cite .. 2n N.W.ld 117 
Government pays, for eligible tenants, an 1. Minnesota law provides a tax exemp-
amuunt equal to their basic rent minus 25 lion to institutions of purely public charity. 
percent of their income The net result of Minn.Const. art. 10, § !; Minn.St. 272.02, 
the rent supplement " that the eligible subd. 6. There is no question that Rio Vista 
tenants have to expend no more than 25 is liable for the tax, as determined by the 
p..rcent of their income for rent. Nineteen trial court, if it does not qualify as a purely 
of the 48 tenants qualify for the rent sup- public charity. The Internal Revenue Ser-
plement vice and Minnesota Department of Revenue 
Rio Vista paid real estate taxes on the 
property from !974 to 1976 on the basis of a 
20-percent assessment. The taxes in 1976 
were $14,278 54 Rio Vista paid the first 
half of these in !\lay 1976 and then brought 
an artion to recover the 1976 taxes, arguing 
1t is a tax-exempt chanty.3 The trial court 
dt'allowed the claim, asserting that Rio Vis-
ta was not an institution of purely public 
charity so as to qualify for a tax-exempt 
status as provided by Minnesota law 
The issues presented are: 
II) Is a nonprofit corporation which pro-
vides housing under a section 236 Federally 
subsidized program to families of modest 
1ncoml's an institution of purely public char-
ity for purposes of Minnesota real estate 
taxes? 
121 Is an institution of purely public char-
ity obligated to pay real estate taxes under 
!\!inn St. 273 13' 
I 0 percl:'nt of the available apartments art> rent-
ffi to such persons. or (5) a d1splacee 
3. This acuon was brought under Minn Sl c 
2ik For an m-depth discussion of the grounds 
and procedures for challenging Minnesota real 
propert) taxes. see. Note, 4 Wm Mitchell 
L Rev 37 I 
4. In Mountain Homes Inc \' State Tax 
Comm'n i7 r... .\1ex 649. 427 P2d 13 (1967), 
the cr•urt rPlwd hea\ ii) on the fact that the 
!enanb .... ere charged rent in an amount suffi. 
c1ent to pay the cost of the project 
In Westmin1ster Gerontology Foundation, 
Inc \I Suire Tax Comm n. 522 S W 2d 754 
(l\lo !975). the !\11ssoun Supreme Court con-
cluded that the housing in question was not 
entitled to a lax exemption as a chanty, relying 
heai,.1Jy on the fact that s1gmf1cant rents were 
collected from the tenants This case has smce 
been disapproved by the Missouri court m 
Franciscan Terruuy Pro\· State Tax 
Comm'n. 566 SW 2d 213 (Mo 1978). where the 
\11ssoun Supreme Court indicated thal lhe case 
erroneous]) overlooked the fact lhat the renls 
had been provided at a substantial cosl Sa\,ngs 
have concluded that Rio Vista is a tax-ex-
empt charity for the purpose of income 
taxation, but these determinations are not 
controlling on the issues before us. 
Several other jurisdictions have addressed 
the question of whether privately operated, 
low-rent housing is entitled to tax-exempt 
status where funds or subsidies are provid-
ed by the Federal Government. These 
courts have not been consistent in their 
result or reasoning. Several courts have 
determined that such housing is not tax 
exempt because of such reasons as the sig-
nificant rent paid by the tenants,• the dona-
tions came from the government rather 
than private sources,1 and low-income hous-
ing does not further a charitable objective.• 
On the other hand, two courts have con-
sidered the tax-exempt status of section 236 
housing in particular and both have con-
cluded the housing is tax exempt.1 A 
Pennsylvania court also granted tax-ex-
from Federal subs1d1es "comparable to charita-
ble contnbut1ons from md1v1duals or corpora-
uons " 566 S W 2d 223 
5. Waterbury First Church Housmg, Inc. v. 
Brown. 170 Conn 556, 367 A.2d 1386 (1976). 
I. Although the Pennsylvania court had recog-
nized in Four Freedoms House of Ph1/adelph1a, 
Inc v Philade/ph1a, 443 Pa 215, 279 A.2d 155 
( 1971 ). that Federally assisted housing for the 
elderly is enl1lled to a Lax exemption, a Penn-
sylvania lower court has construed that dec1-
s1on as restncting the exemption to housing for 
the elderly becaus' housing for low and moder-
ate income persons does not further a charita· 
ble objective. Metropolitan Pittsburgh Non-
profit Housing Corp v. Board of Property As-
sessment. Appeals and ReView, 28 Pa. 
(Cmwlth.) 356, 368 A.2d 837 (1977). 
7. Banahan v. Presbyterian Housing Corp., 553 
S w 2d 48 (Ky.1977), Franciscan Tertiary 
Prov v Stace T.vc Comm 'n., supra. These 
cases are virtually indistJnguishable from the 
Rw Vista situation 
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empt status to a similar housing project, 
even though rent was paid by the tenants 
becaust such rent was below fair market 
rent. 8 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has never 
addressed thf' precise issue presented in this 
case Although an exhaustive definition of 
"charity" cannot be given, this court has 
adopted the following general definition (In 
re Junior Achievement of Greater Minneap-
olis v. S!<lte, 271 Minn. 385, 390, 135 N W.2d 
881, 885 (1965]) 
"The legal meaning of the word 'chari-
ty' has a broader significance than in 
common speech and has been expanded in 
numerous decisions Charity is broadly 
defined as a gift, to be applied consistent-
ly with existing laws, for the benefit of 
an indefinite number of persons 'by 
bringing their hearts under the influence 
of education or religion, by relieving their 
bodies from disease, suffering, or con-
straint, by assisting them to establish 
themselves for life, or by erecting or 
maintaining public buildings or works, or 
otherwise lessening the burdens of 
government" 
Accord, Mayo Foundation "· Commr. of 
Revenue, 306 Minn. 25, 33, 236 N.W.2d 767, 
771 (1975) 
(1) Recently. this court set forth six fac-
tors to be considered in determining wheth-
er the entity in question comes within this 
definition (North S!<lr Research Inst. v. 
County of Hennepin, 306 Minn. 1, 6, 236 
N.W.2d 754, 756 [1975]) 
• (!) whether the stated pur-
pose of the undertaking is to be helpful to 
others without immediate expectation of 
material reward; (2) whether the entity 
involved is supported by donations and 
gifts in whole or in part; (3) whether the 
recipienL() of the 'charity' are required to 
pay for the assistance received in whole 
or in part; (4) whether the income re-
ceived from gifL, and donations and 
charges to users produces a profit to the 
8. Four Freedoms House of Ph1/adelph1a, Inc v 
PhJ/adelph1a. supra Generally, courts are Jess 
willing to deny the tax-exempt status when the 
amounts paid by benef1c1anes of the chanty are 
charitable institution; (5) whether the 
beneficiaries of the 'charity' are restrict-
ed or unrestricted and, if restricted, 
whether the class of persons to whom the 
charity is made available is one having a 
reasonable relationship to the charitable 
objectives; (6) whether dividends, in 
form or substance, or assets upon dissolu-
tion are available to private interests." 
Accord, Minneso!Ji State Bar As.<n. v. 
Commr. of Taxation, 307 Minn. 389, 392, 240 
N.W.2d 321, 323 (1976); Mayo Foundation 
v. Commr. of Revenue, 306 Minn. 34, 236 
N.W.2d 772. 
Applying these factors, there is little 
question that three of them support the 
conclusion that Rio Vista is a tax-..xempt 
charity. Applying the first factor, the pur-
pose of Rio Vista, as stated in its bylaws 
and articles of incorporation, is to provide 
housing to low and moderate income fami-
lies on a nonprofit basis. Applying the 
fourth factor, Rio Vista has not made a 
profit, losing from $16,802 to $22,588 in the 
years 1972 through 1976. Applying the 
sixth factor, Rio Vista's articles of incorpo-
ration require that upon dissolution, the 
assets shall be disposed of in a manner that 
precludes any distribution to a private in-
terest. 
Application of the remaining factors 
presents greater difficulty. The second fac-
tor looks to the extent of support by dona-
tions. Without a doubt, the very existence 
of Rio Vista can be attributed to support 
from the Federal Government because the 
government guaranteed and funded in part 
the low-interest construction loan and it 
also provides a significant rent assistance. 
There is some question, however, of wheth-
er this factor encompasses governmental 
assistance as well as private donations. 
The trial court concluded that the donations 
must be private rather than public. How-
ever, at least one Minnesota case, as well as 
cases from other jurisdictions,• indicates 
that the donation may be from public as 
less than cost. Annotation, 37 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
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9. Stt cases cited in footnotes 7 and 8. 
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well .., private sources In in re Claim of casions ha.g stated that redevelop.nent and 
As.1embly Homes, Inc 1· Ye/low Medicine construction of dwellings under housing and 
County, 2'13 Minn. 197, I40 N.W.2d 336 redevelopment statutes ha.g a "public pur-
l 1%6), this court held that a nursing home pose" in the oontext of eminent domain. 
"a.s a tax-exempt chanty even though the Housing and Redevelopment Authority v. 
resident.' care was paid by the county we)- Froney, 305 Minn. 450, 234 N.W.2d 894 
fare boards and the Veterans Administra- (197.5); Housing and Redevelopment Au-
tion, as well .., by private contributions. thority v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 96 
[2] We conclude that Rio Vista satisfies 
the requirements of the second factor. The 
fact that the donor is the Federal Govern-
ment and not a private institution does not 
preclude a determination that Rio Vista is 
supported in part by donations 
N.W.2d 673 (1959); Thomas v. Housing and 
Redevelopment Authority of Duluth, 234 
Minn. 221, 48 N.W.2d 175 (1951). The legis-
lature also ha.g declared that shortage of 
housing for low and moderate income fami-
lies is inimical to public welfare. Minn.St. 
462A.02, subd. 2. By analogy. private enti-
We now turn to the fifth factor-wheth- ties that provide housing for low and mod-
er the class of beneficiaries has a reasonable 
relationship to charitable objectives. Rio 
V 1sta argues that housing for low and mod-
erate income families furthers a charitable 
objective. As demonstrated by this court's 
definition of "charity" set forth in In re 
Junior Achievement of Greater Minneapolis 
v. State, supra, this factor is intertwined 
with the question of whether such housing 
"lessens the burdens of government." 
[3] We conclude that housing for low 
and moderate income families furthers a 
charitable objective and lessens the burdens 
of government. It would be anomalous to 
hold that governmental objectives are not 
furthered by a nonprofit corporation which 
implements a Federally created and funded 
program The trial court concluded that 
the burdens of government were increased 
from the program because Federal funds 
were spent. In this regard the trial court 
confused the second factor of "donation" 
w 1th the fifth factor of "charitable objec-
tive." If private organizations did not im· 
plement these Federally assisted housing 
projects, presumably the government might 
seek to implement them through govern-
ment agencies. Thus, private organization 
which assist the Federal Government in the 
implementation of these projects do pro-
mote charitable objectives and Jessen the 
burdens of government. 
Our conclusion is buttressed by decisions 
of this court and statements of the Minne-
sota Legislature. This court on several oc-
erate inoome families should be deemed to 
further a public purpose and Jessen the bur-
dens of government. 
[ 4) The most troublesome issue is 
presented by the application of the third 
factor-whether recipients of the charity 
are required to pay for the assistance in 
whole or in part. This factor has been 
considered in three Minnesota cases. In 
Camping & Education Foundation v. State, 
282 Minn. 245, 164 N.W.2d 369 (1969), this 
court denied tax-<>xempt status to a camp 
which was supported mainly through tui-
tion, characterizing the camp as a "commer-
cial activity." In Madonna Towers v. 
Commr. of Taxation, 283 Minn. 111, 167 
N.W.2d 712 (1969), this court denied tax-<>x-
empt status to a retirement apartment com-
plex where the basic financial plan of the 
project wa.g to create the capital structure 
by the proceeds of a membership fee. This 
court denied tax-exempt status to a similar 
retirement apartment complex in the case 
of State v. United Church Homes, 292 Minn. 
323, 195 N.W.2d 411 (1972). 
The situation at Rio Vista cannot be dis-
tinguished easily from these cases. The 
monthly basic rents presently charged at 
Rio Vista are $125 for a I-bedroom unit and 
$165 for a 2-bedroom unit, plus electricity. 
The commercial nature of the operation is 
also renected in the fact that a tenant may 
be evicted for failure to pay rent. Further, 
the exhibits indicate that rents cover ap-
proximately 77 percent of the total operat-
ing costs at Rio Vista. 
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However, our reading of the record also 
indicates that much of this rent is actually 
paid by the Federal Government. Thus, 
rents actually paid by tenants are not the 
major source of revenue to the project. 
This is a distinguishing feature of the Rio 
Vista situation: Tenants receive the hous-
ing at considerably less than market value 
or cost. This is unlike the situation in the 
Camping & Education Foundation, Madon-
na To"'ers, and United Church Homes 
cases. 
[5] Considering all six factors, we con-
clude that Rio Vista is an institution of 
purely public charity. Admittedly, the 
question is close. The decision of the trial 
court is supported by a well-reasoned mem-
orandum. Nevertheless, we conclude that 
Rio Vista meets the standards and defini-
tions devised by this court for qualification 
as an institution of purely public charity. 
The fact that a purely public charity re-
ceives some remuneration from those it 
benefits does not deprive the institution of 
its charitable exemption. The amount of 
remuneration in relation to benefits con-
ferred always require an analysis of the 
facts of each case. 
[6] 2. We find no merit to the state's 
contention that institutions of purely public 
charity lose their tax-£xempt status by rea-
son of Minn.St. 273.13, subd. 17, which pro-
vides that Title II housing for the elderly or 
for low and moderate income families shall 
be assessed at 20 percent of the market 
value for the purpose of real property tax-
es." There is no question that Rio Vista's 
property is Title II housing However, it is 
argued by Rio Vista that § 273.13 is a 
classification statute rather than a taxing 
statute, and therefore the statute has no 
10. Mmn St 273 13, subd 17, provides "A 
structure situated on real property that 1s used 
for housing for the elderly or for low and mod-
erate income families as defined by Title JI of 
the Natwnal Housing Act or the Minnesota 
housing finance agency law of 1971 or regula-
tions promulgated by the agency pursuant 
thereto and financed bv a direct Federal loan or 
Federally insured or a loan made by the 
Minnesota housing finance agency pursuant to 
the provisions of either of said acts and acts 
application to tax-£xempl institotions or 
purely public charity. 
We agree. Se<:tion 273.13, subd. 1, states: 
"All real and personal property subject 
to a general property tax and not subject 
to any gross earnings or other lieu tax is 
hereby classified for purposes of taxation 
as provided by this section." (Italics sup-
plied.) 
Giving effect to this language, the 20-per-
cenl assessment under§ 273.13, subd. 17, is 
not applicable to tax-.,xempl property be-
cause such property is not "subject to a 
general property tax." Section 273.13 clas-
sifies property which is already subject to 
taxation; it does not authorize the imposi-
tion of a new tax on otherwise untaxed 
property. 
Our conclusion is supported by other stat-
utory provisions. Institutions or purely 
public charity derive their exemptions from 
taxation under the provisions of Minn.St. 
272.02. According to the language of that 
section, the tax-£xempt status is limited 
only by the provisions set forth in §§ 272.02 
and 272.02.5. Had the legislature intended 
to limit or remove the tax-£xempt status of 
charitable Title II housing, it could have 
provided such in § 272.02 or § 272.025. By 
placing the provision for a 20-percent tax 
on Title II housing in § 273.13, we hold that 
the tax-£xempt status of Rio Vista is unaf-
fected and that the 20-percent tax does not 
apply to tax-.,xempl institutions of purely 
public charity. 
Reversed. 
OTIS, J ., took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of this case. 
amendatory thereof shall, for 15 years from the 
date of the completion of the original construc-
tion or substantial rehabihtatJon, or for the 
original term of the loan. be assessed at 20-per-
cent of the market value thereof, provided that 
the fair market value as determined by the 
assessor 1s based on the normal approach to 
value using normal unrestricted rents " 
Subd l 7a provides· "The provision of subdi-
vtsion 17 shall apply only to non-profit and 
limited dividend entitles " 
